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Abstract 
We examine the effects of the Czech National Bank communication, macroeconomic news 
and interest rate differential on exchange rate volatility using generalized autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity model. Our results suggest that central bank communication 
has a calming effect on exchange rate volatility. The timing of central bank communication 
seems to matter, too, as financial markets respond more to the communication before the 
policy meetings than after them. Next, macroeconomic news releases are found to reduce 
exchange rate volatility, while interest rate differential seems to increase it.  
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1.  Introduction 
A considerable effort has been spent in last one or two decades to improve monetary policy 
transparency and to provide a clear communication of monetary policy actions in order to 
manage inflation expectations effectively. While the authoritative survey on central bank 
communication by Blinder et al. (2008) documents that the effects of central bank 
communication on financial markets were examined in many developed countries, but the 
evidence on emerging market economies is rather scant.
1 
 
In this paper, we aim to bridge this gap and study the impact of central bank communication 
on exchange rate volatility in one of small open emerging economies, the Czech Republic.
2 
We choose the exchange rate market, as this market is often of much larger importance than 
other segments of financial markets for the economic fluctuations in emerging economies. 
More specifically, we are interested how the releases of oral and written policy statements by 
the central bank (controlling for macroeconomic news and other factors) influence the 
exchange rate volatility using generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity 
(GARCH) model. Additional hypothesis that we want to address in this short policy paper is 
whether the timing of central bank communication matters, i.e. whether the financial markets 
respond to the communication more strongly before the monetary policy meetings than after 
them (see Ehrmann and Fratscher, 2007).  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our empirical methodology and data. 
Section 3 presents the results. Concluding remarks follow. 
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2.  Data and Empirical Methodology 
We use daily data from 3
rd January 2005 to 14
th February 2007, which makes 536 
observations. The use of daily data is justified, if the main interest is to investigate the 
effectiveness of central bank communication (Jansen and de Haan, 2005) as well as by the 
recent evidence suggesting that it may takes several days until news are fully absorbed by 
financial markets (Evans and Lyons, 2005). The source of central bank communication and 
macroeconomic news variables is Reuters. Daily exchange rate and interest rate data are taken 
from the Czech National Bank (CNB). 
 
Our baseline specification is a GARCH(1,1)
3 process for exchange rate returns,  
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st denotes the log of CZK/EUR.
4 The constant term in equation (1), µ, shows the average rate 
of appreciation or depreciation. The error term, ξt, of the mean equation (1) is assumed to 
have a conditional variance, σ
2
t, specified by (2). The conditional variance equation includes in 
addition to the constant,  1 γ , ARCH term, ξt-1, and GARCH term, σ
2
t-1, the variables capturing 
the effect of central bank communication, CBit, macroeconomic news, newst, and interest rate 
differential, intdifft.  
 
We use the following variables to assess the effect of central bank communication: 
commentt – dummy variable that takes a value of unity on days, when a member of Czech 
National Bank Board commented verbally on the price stability, economic outlook, interest   4
rates or exchange rate. The Board comprises of seven members, all with equal weight in 
monetary policy rate setting process. The governor has a casting vote in case, when some 
members are missing at the monetary policy meeting and their number is even.
5 
timingt – is defined as the product of commentt  and variable Г, which is a categorical variable 
and takes value of 30 on the day of monetary policy meeting, 29 on the day before the 
meeting, 28 on two days before the meeting and so on. In consequence, comments closer to 
monetary policy meeting get greater weight.  
minutest – is a dummy variable with unitary value on the day, when monetary policy minutes 
are published (this is typically 12 days after monetary policy meeting). 
 
It follows from the definition of our variables capturing the central bank communication that 
we focus on whether the central bank talked to the markets the rather than on interpreting the 
content of its communication. Therefore, the central bank communication variables are 
included only in the variance equation and exchange rate is assumed to follow random walk. 
 
Macroeconomic news, newst, is a dummy variable that takes a value of unity on days, in 
which scheduled macroeconomic news is released. Macroeconomic news dummy includes the 
releases of new data on the Czech producer and consumer price indexes, GDP and balance of 
payments. Interest rate differential, intdifft, is a difference between Czech and the euro area 
money market rate (1YPRIBOR and 1YEURIBOR, respectively).  
 
In case of tick-by-tick data, the impact of central bank communication and macroeconomic 
news on exchange rate volatility should be non-negative, as the new information they contain 
affects the exchange rate return. However, in case of daily data, the expected sign of these 
variables is not clear-cut and the existing literature documents accordingly that they may both   5
increase or decrease exchange rate volatility (Jansen and de Haan, 2005, Gabriel and Pinter, 
2006, Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007) according to whether it has a calming effect on the 
markets or not. Additionally, greater interest rate differential is likely to increase exchange 
rate volatility (Kocenda and Valachy, 2006). Larger differential may signal the lack of 
synchronization of business cycle and subsequently monetary policy and exchange rate is thus 
more likely to adjust. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  st  commentt timingt  minutest newst  intdifft 
Mean 28.99  0.11  2.32  0.05  0.21  -0.46 
Median 28.78  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.36 
Maximum 30.56  1.00  29.00  1.00  1.00  0.40 
Minimum 27.42  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -1.17 
Standard deviation  0.83  0.32  6.69  0.21  0.41  0.40 
Skewness 0.25  2.43  2.68  4.30  1.42  0.35 
Kurtosis 1.70  6.90  8.57  19.44  3.00  2.50 
Jarque-Bera test  43.30  864.9  1332  7676  178.5  16.43 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Observations  536 536 536 536 536 536 
Notes:  p-values are reported in the brackets. Exchange rate series in levels. 
 
Next, we present the descriptive statistics of key variables. Several issues are noteworthy. 
Czech central bank communication occurs on about every tenth day on average, while 
macroeconomic announcements are released more common (with the mean of 0.21). Minutes 
occur monthly, as the frequency of monetary policy meetings is monthly in our sample 
period, too (as there are 22 business days on average per month, the mean is 0.05). Czech 
interest rates were on average nearly 0.5 percentage point below the euro area during sample 
period.    
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Chart 1 presents the frequency of central bank communication. As the monetary policy 
meeting is typically held on Thursday, the results indicate that the frequency of 
communication is much lower in the week the monetary policy meeting is held (see the 
frequencies on the days 1-3 in Chart 1).  The communication is the most intense from 10 to 6 
days before the monetary policy meeting takes place. This finding is in line with evidence on 
the Bank of England, European Central Bank and the U.S. Federal Reserve (see Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher, 2007), where communication is more common, as the meeting comes closer. On 
the other hand, in contrast to these central banks, we can see that the Czech central bank 
communication is not more frequent after the monetary policy meeting.  We suppose that this 
reflects the fact that the CNB puts a lot of effort in explaining their interest rate decision and 
risk scenarios at the press conference just after the monetary policy meeting was held.  
 
Chart 1: Frequency of Central Bank Communication 
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 01 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 92 0
 
Note: Horizontal axis measure the days before monetary policy meeting. Vertical axis 
gives the frequency.  
 
3.  Results 
Table 2 presents our results on the determinants of exchange rate volatility. We find that that 
central bank communication tends to decrease exchange rate volatility, i.e. this supports the   7
view that central bank aims to decrease the noise in the financial markets (Blinder et al., 
2008). The finding complies with Jansen and de Haan (2005) and Gabriel and Pinter (2006), 
who also find that the exchange rate volatility of EUR/USD and HUF/EUR, respectively is 
lower on the day, when central bank communicates its views on the economy to the public.  
 
In addition, the results suggest that timing of central bank communication seems to matter, 
too.
6 Similarly, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) study the timing of central bank 
communication for the case of Bank of England, European Central Bank and the U.S. Federal 
Reserve Bank. Despite they define the measure of timing of central bank communication 
differently (primarily using various dummy variables and interacting them with the model 
coefficients), their results suggest that the timing of communication is informative for a whole 
variety of financial assets including the exchange rate.  
 
We also find that the effect of central bank minutes is not clear, as the sign of coefficient 
differs across the specifications. The effect of macroeconomic news is somewhat surprising; it 
tends to decrease exchange rate volatility. This may reflect the fact the there is higher 
uncertainty in emerging markets and news is likely to have calming effect on the markets. 
Nevertheless, this effect is found also in some other studies in developed countries such as 
Kim et al. (2004), who report that DEM/USD exchange rate volatility decreases on the day 
the news on producer price index is released. Greater interest rate differential is found to 
increase exchange rate volatility (see also Kocenda and Valachy, 2006, for further evidence in 
the case of Czech Republic).  
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Table 2: The Effect of Central Bank Communication on Exchange Rate Volatility 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
µ  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
γ1  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
γ2  0.15*** 0.15***  0.01  0.15*  0.15* 
  [0.05] [0.05] [0.01] [0.08] [0.09] 
γ3  0.60*** 0.60*** 0.95*** 0.60*** 0.60*** 
  [0.09] [0.10] [0.02] [0.15] [0.17] 
φ1 (commentt)  -3.37***     -3.24**  
  [1.19]    [1.31]  
φ2 (timingt)   -0.15**    -0.16** 
   [0.07]    [0.06] 
φ 3 (minutest)    4.78***  -4.62**  -4.80* 
     [1.21]  [2.33]  [2.61] 
ρ1  -3.66***  -3.59* -0.99**  -3.64** -3.57* 
  [0.91] [2.18] [0.40] [1.85] [2.06] 
ρ2  1.81*** 1.81 0.36***  1.86*  1.79 
  [0.70] [1.37] [0.19] [1.09] [1.38] 
       
L-B(10),  RES  12.84 12.77 13.01 12.85 12.96 
L-B(10), SQRES    10.59  11.79  9.03  13.43  12.44 
Schwartz  inf.  crit.  -8.69 -8.70 -8.86 -8.70 -8.70 
N  536 536 536 536 536 
Notes: We report standard errors in parenthesis and Ljung-Box Q-statistics of the 10
th lag 
for standardized and squared residuals. ***, **, and * - denotes significance at 1 percent, 5 
percent, and 10 percent, respectively. The value of φ1, φ2, φ3, ρ1 and ρ2 are multiplied by 10
6. 
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4.  Concluding remarks 
We analyze the importance of central bank communication, macroeconomic news and interest 
rate differential on exchange rate volatility in the Czech Republic using GARCH framework. 
Our main results are as follows. Central bank communication tends to decrease exchange rate 
volatility, i.e. this supports the view that central bank aims to decrease the noise in the 
financial markets. The timing of central bank communication seems to matter, too. 
Macroeconomic news is found to decrease exchange rate volatility. This may reflect the fact 
the there is higher uncertainty in emerging markets and news is likely to have calming effect 
on the markets.   10
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1 See also Kohn and Sack (2003) on why and how the central bank communication matters for financial markets. 
2 Rozkrut et al. (2007) study the impact of central bank communication on the interest rate in a group of Central 
European countries. Anecdotal evidence on monetary policy communication of the Czech National Bank is 
provided by Bulir and Smidkova (2007). 
3 Note that we also estimated GARCH model with higher lags, but failed to find them significant. In addition, as 
bad news are sometimes found to matter more in financial markets, we also examined asymmetric GARCH 
models such as threshold autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity – TARCH – model or exponential 
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity – EGARCH, but did not find any asymmetry. These 
results are available upon request. See Bollerslev (1986) on GARCH modelling. 
4 Eq. (1) is defined in levels, as we can’t reject the null hypothesis of unit root in the level of exchange rate. 
5 For this reason, we assess whether the communication of governor matters more than the communication of 
other members. We construct two dummy variables for the communication of governor and other Board 
members. Controlling for other factors, we find the coefficient on governor’s communication larger than the 
coefficient on other member’s communication, but the difference between the respective coefficients is not 
statistically significant.   
6 The correlation coefficient between timing and comments is 0.96 and therefore, we do not include these two 
variables together in the regression because of multicollinearity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 